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Introduction
There has been a lively exchange in this 
journal between Inmaculada de Melo-
Martin and John Harris on the ethics of 
mitochondrial replacement techniques 
(MRTs). Initially, Harris advocated, here 
and elsewhere, for MRTs.1 He tried to 
show that the arguments against them 
are flawed and that MRT research and 
clinical practice should be supported 
because MRTs diminish suffering and 
increase well-being.
In response, de Melo-Martin2 argued 
that Harris’s arguments defending MRTs 
are found wanting and that the scientific 
community should oppose them. She 
contended three things: that Harris only 
engaged with the weakest arguments that 
have been advanced against MRTs, that 
the resources that are used for MRT 
research and clinical practice should be 
repurposed for achieving worthier goals, 
and that MRTs are not necessary for 
women who have a mitochondrial DNA 
disease and want to have children geneti-
cally related to them, as they could have 
children through other means (e.g., adop-
tion or egg donation).
Harris then replied3 to de Melo-Martin 
and defended his arguments. First, he 
argued that in most instances both of 
them maintain the same position regard-
ing de Melo-Martin’s objections to MRTs, 
and that where they do diverge, it is de 
Melo-Martin who is on the wrong side. 
Second, Harris contends that de Melo-
Martin’s main criticism is off target. He 
maintains that he was not making any 
claim about what priority we should give 
to MRT research and clinical practice, 
only that his sole aim was to assess if 
in principle MRTs, conceived solely as 
biotechnologies and abstracted from our 
social reality, are morally objectionable 
or not.
This article constitutes a fourth act 
in this interplay of opinion. Here I will 
broaden the scope of the debate by pre-
senting a richer account of the MRTs 
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phenomenon: when each of the tech-
niques that have jointly been labelled as 
MRTs (i.e., pronuclear transfer [PNT] and 
maternal spindle transfer [MST]) are 
independently examined, it becomes 
clear that the ethical panorama is far 
more complex than it first appears. I will 
also develop areas that naturally follow 
from de Melo-Martin’s and Harris’s dis-
cussion of the topic.
This article proceeds as follows. In the 
first section, I describe what mitochon-
drial diseases and MRTs are. This is 
important because in order to explain the 
differences among MRTs I need to expand 
on Harris’s portrayal of “mitochondrial 
disease,” which de Melo-Martin seems 
to follow. In the second section I address 
how MRTs could prevent mitochondrial 
diseases and if they would be effective in 
doing so. I do this by unpacking the dif-
ferences among MRTs. In the final section 
I present and defend that parents have 
strong reasons to disclose to their chil-
dren that they were MRT conceived, and 
show how this relates to Harris’s and 
de Melo-Martin’s discussion of whether 
there is such thing as a “right to know 
our genetic origins.”
Mitochondrial Diseases and MRTs
Mitochondria are cellular organelles that 
generate the energy that cells need to 
work properly. They are characterized 
by possessing their own DNA (mito-
chondrial DNA [mtDNA]), by only being 
inherited via the maternal line,4 and by 
the fact that their means of inheritance 
are non-Mendelian.5 Whereas nuclear 
DNA (nDNA) represents 99.9% of total 
human DNA, mtDNA only represents 
0.1%.6
In both “Germline Modification and 
the Burden of Human Existence” and 
“Germline Manipulation and Our Future 
Worlds,” Harris states that “[m]itochon-
drial disease can be very serious, caus-
ing conditions like Leigh’s disease, a 
fatal infant encephalopathy, and others 
that waste muscles or cause diabetes and 
deafness.”7 De Melo-Martin, in “When 
the Milk of Human Kindness becomes 
a Luxury (and Untested) Good. A Reply 
to Harris’ Unconditional Embrace of 
Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques,” 
does not provide a characterization of 
mitochondrial diseases.
I will expand on Harris’s characteriza-
tion of “mitochondrial disease,” because 
for the sake of this discussion it is impor-
tant to be specific about the details of 
what mitochondrial diseases are and 
how MRTs could prevent them. In a 
broad sense, there are two classes of 
mitochondrial diseases: mitochondrial 
diseases that are caused by problems in 
the mtDNA, and mitochondrial diseases 
that are caused by problems in the 
nDNA.8 This distinction is important 
because MRTs cannot be employed to 
deal with mitochondrial diseases caused 
by problems in the nDNA. MRTs can 
only be employed when the problems are 
caused by the genes in the mitochondria 
themselves. In other words, MRTs can 
only be employed when dealing with 
mtDNA diseases.
MtDNA diseases are a group of neu-
romuscular diseases that cause suffer-
ing and premature death.9 MtDNA is 
not uniform: there exist various muta-
tions among the mitochondria, some 
of which are deleterious (i.e., mutations 
that prevent mitochondria from produc-
ing adequate levels of energy). Mutations, 
both deleterious and non-deleterious, 
can be maternally inherited or created 
spontaneously. In some instances, dele-
terious mutant DNA can be the only type 
of mtDNA that mitochondria possess. 
This is referred to as “homoplasmy.” 
Additionally, deleterious mutant DNA 
can be present only in some mitochon-
dria, known as “heteroplasmy.”
Women with homoplasmic mtDNA 
containing deleterious mutations will 
always pass on the deleterious mutant 
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mtDNA to their genetic offspring, irre-
spective of whether the kind of muta-
tion will cause medical problems or 
not. Women with heteroplasmic mtDNA 
mutations, on the other hand, will pass 
on a mixture of mitochondria to their off-
spring, some of them without deleterious 
mutations and some of them with delete-
rious mutations. In this case, the manifes-
tation of the disease will depend on the 
deleterious mtDNA mutant load and the 
kind of mutation that is present.10
MRTs11
In his two articles on the subject of 
MRTs12 and his response to de Melo-
Martin,13 Harris does not characterize 
the techniques that could be employed 
to avoid mtDNA diseases.14 This was 
not necessary, as he was interested in 
discussing the ethics of germline modi-
fications, and both types of MRT can 
cause such modifications when select-
ing for females. De Melo-Martin15 also 
does not present a characterization of 
these techniques. In fact, she mentions 
only MST when discussing the safety 
issues related to MRTs, referencing the 
research of Tachibana et al.16
In de Melo-Martin’s case, the absence 
of a proper characterization of both MST 
and PNT is relevant because the differ-
ences between them yield different philo-
sophical conclusions when considering 
issues about harm and identity, as 
Wrigley et al.17 and Palacios-González18 
have examined. I return to this point 
when I discuss how mtDNA diseases 
can be “prevented” through MRTs.
The two most recently developed tech-
niques that could help women affected 
by mtDNA diseases to have disease-free, 
genetically related children are MST and 
PNT, as said previously. Here I present a 
summarized version of how these tech-
niques work.
In PNT, an oocyte from a woman 
with an mtDNA disease (Woman A) 
and an oocyte from a donor that pos-
sesses healthy mitochondria (Woman B) 
undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF). The 
oocytes can be fertilized with sperm 
from Woman A’s partner or with sperm 
from a donor. After the sperm has fertil-
ized the oocytes, and during the first 
hours, the nuclear material of both pro-
genitors is enclosed in different mem-
branes that are called the male and female 
pronuclei. On day one in the develop-
ment phase, and prior to the fusion of the 
pronuclei, the pronuclei of both zygotes 
are removed. The pronuclei housed in 
the cell produced with the donor’s egg 
are discarded along with Woman A’s 
now enucleated cell (remember that this 
cell possesses deleteriously mutated 
mtDNA). The pronuclei from Woman A, 
and her partner’s or donor’s pronuclei, 
are ferried into the now enucleated cell 
that was produced with Woman B’s 
oocyte (remember that this cell possesses 
healthy mitochondria). The fused cell is 
transferred into the woman intending to 
be the genetic mother, or a surrogate, and 
if everything goes according to plan the 
embryo will develop normally.19
In MST, assisted reproductive tech-
niques are used to obtain eggs from the 
woman with an mtDNA disease (Woman 
A) and from a donor with healthy mito-
chondria (Woman B). The nDNA (which 
is found on one side of the oocyte in a 
spindle-shaped group) from both oocytes 
is removed. The chromosomes of Woman 
A are then ferried into Woman B’s enucle-
ated egg. Woman B’s chromosomes and 
Woman A’s enucleated oocyte (again 
remember that this cell possesses delete-
riously mutated mtDNA) are discarded. 
The reconstructed egg, which has healthy 
mitochondria, goes through IVF and then 
is transferred into the intending mother, 
or a surrogate. The fused cell will go on to 
develop normally, if everything goes as 
planned.20
Two things bear mentioning. First, 
in both MST and PNT, it is possible 
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that mitochondria with deleterious muta-
tions could accidentally be transferred 
when the chromosomal carry-over is tak-
ing place. If this were the case, it is not 
impossible that the mtDNA disease could 
manifest in the child. Second, if MST 
and PNT are successful, then the healthy 
mitochondria provided by the egg donor 
will be passed down via the maternal line 
to all subsequent generations. This means 
that if females are selected for when MST 
or PNT are used, then the third-party 
mitochondria will be inherited when 
these women reproduce. If, on the other 
hand, males are selected for, then the 
mitochondria will not be passed down to 
the next generation.
How Do MRTs Prevent mtDNA Diseases?
Harris states that “MRT will prevent 
serious mitochondrial disease and the 
suffering it causes for women with mito-
chondrial disease, for their own children, 
and for countless future generations.”21 
I will now explore how MRTs could do 
this.
Whereas Harris is in general opti-
mistic about the development of MRTs, 
de Melo-Martin is sceptical. She argues 
with him that the resources invested 
in the development of MRTs and 
their translation into clinical practice 
only benefits a very small number of 
people:
[I]f reduction of the burdens of mito-
chondrial disorders were indeed the 
goal, research on basic and clinical 
studies on the causes, prevention, and 
treatment of these diseases will in all 
likelihood be more effective than research 
on MRTs. Even if all the women who 
could be eligible to use them did so—a 
big “if” indeed—these technologies 
would still have a relatively limited 
application. On the other hand, research 
on the diseases themselves and on more 
effective treatments for mitochondrial 
disorders would be of use to all of those 
with these diseases.22
First, one needs to be aware that MST 
and PNT prevent mtDNA diseases in 
two different ways. In most cases MST 
prevents mtDNA diseases by creating 
someone23 without the disease. MST, in 
most cases, does not cure someone of 
mtDNA disease. If the person who comes 
into existence is tied to her nuclear 
genetic makeup (i.e., if our numerical 
identity depends on our nuclear genetic 
makeup) then MST cannot be said to 
cure anyone, in most cases, because the 
fact that a couple or a woman decide to 
use MST alters the timing of conception 
and thus alters which gametes will 
fuse. For example, it is utterly improb-
able that the same sperm and egg would 
have fused in the following scenarios: 
(1) a couple decided to use MST, or 
(2) the same couple decided to naturally 
reproduce, instead of employing MST. 
Furthermore, it is highly improbable 
that the same sperm and egg would have 
fused if the couple decided to use MST 
but chose to have the procedure 5 weeks 
after MST took place in scenario (1).
I have added the qualification “in most 
cases” because there is the possibility that 
a single sperm and a single egg could 
have been chosen beforehand for the pro-
cedure.24 In this instance, it could be said 
that MST ‘cured’ someone because the 
being who would result from the fertil-
ization if MST did not take place and the 
being who would result from the fertil-
ization if MST did take place would pos-
sess the same nuclear DNA. This being 
the case, one has to conclude that in most 
instances MST prevents mtDNA diseases 
by creating someone without an mtDNA 
disease, and that only when a single sperm 
and egg have been selected beforehand can it 
be said that MST prevents an mtDNA disease 
by curing someone.
PNT as a mere technique, on the other 
hand, prevents mtDNA diseases by 
curing someone affected by them. If 
we accept, as before, that our numerical 
identity depends on our nuclear genetic 
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makeup, then we have to accept that 
an embryo originated with X’s sperm’s 
nDNA, Y’s egg’s nDNA, and the faulty 
mtDNA W (found in Y’s egg) is one 
and the same embryo as that originated 
with X’s sperm’s nDNA, Y’s egg’s nDNA, 
and the healthy mtDNA Z (found in the 
donor’s egg). In this case it can be 
affirmed that PNT prevents mtDNA diseases 
by curing someone. Wrigley et al. have 
defended this point: “In particular, PNT 
is a treatment which is attempting ‘pre-
emptively’ to cure a person without 
affecting his or her identity. Thus, 
PNT is like, or is even a form of, gene 
therapy. MST, on the other hand, is a 
form of selective reproduction and has 
more in common with pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis and pre-natal screen-
ing than it does with gene therapy.”25
Although this is the case,26 when 
one considers conducting PNT in an 
embryo that was specifically produced 
by a woman, or couple, in order to have 
a child without an mtDNA disease (i.e., 
the clinical practice of PNT), if it were not 
for the fact that PNT was going to occur, 
most probably that embryo would not 
have existed. The timing of conception 
would likely have changed and, there-
fore, a different sperm and egg would 
have fused.
This clarification about how PNT 
and MST work is important because it 
indicates, specifically, how MRTs pre-
vent mtDNA diseases, and because it 
shows that de Melo-Martin is incorrect 
when she assumes that MRTs would 
not effectively alleviate the burdens of 
mtDNA diseases. When de Melo-Martin 
speaks about the reduction of burdens of 
mitochondrial disorders, she states that 
other means (such as basic and clinical 
studies on the causes, prevention, and 
treatment of these diseases) would be 
“more effective than research on MRTs.”27 
However, if MRTs work as expected, then 
PNT and MST with preselected gametes 
would in fact be effective in treating 
mtDNA diseases, if “effective” means the 
successful elimination of a condition. It is 
difficult to see how techniques that will 
successfully treat mtDNA diseases can be 
labelled as ineffective.
At this point, de Melo-Martin may 
argue that she is not talking about how 
effective MRTs are, or could be, as clinical 
procedures, but rather how cost-effective 
they are, or could be, when compared 
with the cost-effectiveness of other treat-
ments for mtDNA diseases, or for mito-
chondrial diseases in general. If this is 
true, then she is advancing an empirical 
claim that needs to be supported by 
empirical data, which she does not pro-
vide. Even if these data were available, 
de Melo-Martin would still need to pres-
ent a compelling argument to show that 
we as a society have a moral duty to allo-
cate the most resources to the most cost-
effective research/treatment. And even 
if she presented such an argument, the 
medical community would need to com-
pare all medical research/treatments 
(assuming that this cost-effectiveness 
rationale is restricted to medical practice) 
to find out which would be the most cost 
effective. This means that it is not com-
pletely certain at this point that research/
treatment on MRTs would be halted 
under a cost-effectiveness paradigm.
The problem with the cost-effectiveness 
argument is that it artificially forces one 
to only compare the cost-effectiveness 
of research into MRTs with the cost-
effectiveness of other possible treatments for 
mitochondrial diseases. To reach a con-
clusion, one needs to compare all possible 
medical research/treatments against one 
another and then see how research into 
MRTs fares. If this is what de Melo-Martin 
is arguing, then it has to be accepted that 
her case is at best inconclusive.
Reasons for Disclosure
A central topic of both Harris’s and 
de Melo-Martin’s work is whether 
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MRT-conceived children have a right to 
know their genetic origins. It is impor-
tant to note that whereas Harris states 
that “[a] problem is often raised about 
whether or not resulting children have a 
right or a need to know the identity of the 
mitochondria donor [emphasis added]”28, 
de Melo-Martin focuses on “the alleged 
right to know one’s genetic origins? …
Furthermore, I believe that talk of a right 
to know one’s genetic parentage imbues 
genetic information with very special 
significance and thereby contributes 
to promoting problematic beliefs about 
genetic essentialism.”29 This distinction 
is important because there is a subtle dif-
ference between the right to know the 
identity of the mitochondrial donor and 
the right to know one’s genetic origins. 
The latter alleged right does not seem 
to necessarily imply a right to know the 
identity of those genetic origins.
Harris rejects the idea that there is such 
a right, which he labels as dangerous 
nonsense. He contends that if everybody 
had the right to know who their progeni-
tors were we would need “universal 
paternity testing, with all the mischief 
that this would entail.”30 He anticipates 
“mischief” because of the phenomenon 
known as “non-paternity.” Non-paternity 
is a concept used to describe cases in 
which the biological father of a child is 
not who it is presumed to be. This belief 
can be held by the child, the presumed 
genetic father, or the mother. According 
to Harris, non-paternity cases should 
not be a cause for concern, and he even 
doubts the wisdom of correcting this 
state of affairs. He concludes that “[m]ore 
mischief and anxiety would certainly be 
caused by recognizing a right to know, or 
indeed a duty to disclose, all contributors 
to a given genome.”31
De Melo-Martin is also unpersuaded 
by the supposed “right to know” when 
considering the clinical application of 
MRTs; however, as she states, not for 
the reason that Harris presents: “my 
disinclination to make much of this 
alleged right to know one’s genetic ori-
gins has nothing to do with the phenom-
enon of non-paternity, but simply with 
the fact that no compelling grounds exist 
to support this presumed right.”32
Even if we accept, for the sake of argu-
ment, that there is no such thing as a 
“right to know”33 one’s genetic origins 
or the identity of the mitochondrial 
donor, as de Melo-Martin and Harris 
maintain, it must be noted that there are 
strong reasons to disclose to someone that 
that person was MRT conceived. It is 
important to emphasize that to disclose 
to someone that he or she was MRT 
conceived is not the same as revealing 
who the “mitochondria donor” is, but 
rather it is similar to disclosing to some-
one that he or she was conceived with a 
donated gamete without revealing the 
donor’s identity. It is also important to 
point out that “to disclose to” someone 
should not be understood negatively, as 
in “only if X asks about the way in which 
she was conceived we will tell her that 
she was MRT conceived.” Here disclo-
sure should be understood in a positive 
way: we have to “go and tell” X, at some 
point, that she was MRT conceived.34
Ravelingien and Pennings, when 
discussing the issues surrounding 
the purported “right to know” one’s 
genetic parents (and referencing Vardit 
Ravitsky’s35 work on the topic), touch 
on some of the reasons for disclosing 
to someone his or her genetic back-
ground: “Awareness of one’s genetic 
background is deemed necessary for a 
better understanding of and decision 
making about one’s health risks…
Access to a full picture of one’s genetic 
background is also regarded as essen-
tial in terms of one’s psychological well-
being and family relationships.”36
At this point, I will set aside issues sur-
rounding how knowing that one was 
MRT conceived affects one’s psychologi-
cal well-being and family relationships.37 
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Instead, I will unpack the medical rea-
sons parents have for disclosing to 
their children that they were MRT 
conceived. If parents disclose the 
conditions of their conception, these 
children, when they are old enough, 
will have a better understanding of the 
health risks associated with their con-
ception, or in this case of the uncertain-
ties about such health risks.
Knowing one’s genetic background can 
be instrumentally good: it provides infor-
mation about oneself that might other-
wise not be obvious, and this information 
can be helpful for better assessing and 
managing health risks. Knowing that 
both my parents are recessive carriers 
of a Mendelian-inherited-type genetic 
condition provides me with information 
with which I can make better informed 
decisions regarding my lifestyle choices; 
that is, decisions that could benefit my 
health in the long term such as refrain-
ing from smoking. Although whether I 
have a right to such information is out-
side the scope of this article, it is true 
that possessing such information is 
instrumentally good for me and that 
my parents have at least pro tanto38 rea-
sons to reveal it. This being the case, 
I can also affirm that possessing the infor-
mation that I was MRT conceived can be 
instrumentally good for me, and, there-
fore, that my parents also have pro tanto 
reasons to reveal it. Furthermore, these 
reasons are stronger because the way in 
which I was conceived is novel and, 
therefore, could carry more health risks. 
It must be noted at this point that the 
advent and increasing popularity of per-
sonal genomic services (for example, 
23andMe) could make it possible for 
people to come to know that they were 
MRT conceived without their parents 
having to disclose this to them.
Individuals who know about their 
MRT conception could use this informa-
tion to take better care of their health, 
and to enable their medical team to 
make better decisions when investigat-
ing the causes of an illness, for example. 
As John Appleby says: “Disclosure is 
important for at least two reasons: (1) 
the MRT-conceived person’s own med-
ical welfare; and (2) knowledge of having 
been MRT-conceived enables persons 
to report any medical problems back to 
clinicians and researchers for the sake 
of the wellbeing of future generations 
who might be conceived via MRTs.”39
He further provides an additional 
reason for disclosure: “it would save 
some children from the stress and anxi-
ety of worrying about having from 
the same mtDNA disorders as their 
mothers.40
Harris and de Melo-Martin would 
agree, as would any other reasonable 
person, that regardless of the existence 
of a right to know one’s genetic origins 
or the identity of the mitochondrial 
donor, there are strong pro tanto reasons 
for disclosing to someone that that per-
son was MRT conceived. At this point 
we have to conclude that, although 
their discussion of the supposed “right 
to know” is relevant and regardless of 
whether they are correct or not, it is 
important to go beyond it and take into 
consideration other reasons for disclo-
sure, as just presented.
Conclusion
De Melo-Martin and Harris have had 
a lively debate (which fits within the 
broader scope of recent work on the 
ethics of MRTs that deals with issues 
of identity,41 transgenerational health 
risks,42 the disclosure of MRT concep-
tion,43 genealogical ancestry,44 first 
in-human use,45 the possible use of 
nonhuman oocytes for PNT,46 and the 
anonymity status of the “mitochondrial 
donor”47) regarding the morality of MRT 
research and clinical practice. In this 
article I have broadened the scope of 
the discussion regarding mitochondrial 
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diseases and MRTs. I showed that de 
Melo-Martin’s effectiveness argument 
is at best inconclusive.48 I also showed 
that it is methodologically important 
to differentiate between mitochondrial 
diseases in order to understand which 
diseases MRTs could prevent, and how 
MRTs would do this.
Further, I also showed that the clini-
cal practice of PNT and MST without 
preselected gametes prevents mtDNA 
disease by creating people without an 
mtDNA disease, rather than by curing 
those who already have an mtDNA dis-
ease. PNT and MST with preselected 
gametes, on the other hand, can be said 
to cure mtDNA disease insofar as the 
numerical identity of the individual 
who will be “brought” into existence is 
not altered. This is relevant in relation 
to de Melo-Martin’s claim that other 
research avenues might be more 
“effective” in treating mtDNA diseases, 
despite the fact that if PNT and MST 
with preselected gametes were success-
ful they would for certain be effective 
in treating mtDNA diseases.
Finally, I have shown that parents have 
strong pro tanto reasons for disclosing to 
their children that they were MRT con-
ceived. If they do so, their children will 
be able to make better decisions regard-
ing their medical welfare (this issue 
is heightened by the fact that at least 
the first generation of MRT-conceived 
children would be born from an 
experimental technique), and medical 
teams will be better equipped to treat 
them. This shows that even if there is 
no such thing as a “right to know,” as 
Harris and de Melo-Martin maintain, 
there are important reasons to reveal 
to someone that that person was MRT 
conceived.
The richer account of MRTs that 
I have presented here shows that 
there is much more to be said about 
the morality of MRT research and its 
clinical practice.
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